Abstract

Chapter 1. Introduction
1. Background and motivation

Chapter 2. Literature Review

Chapter 3. Formulation of Coalition Formation Game
1. Formulation of a two-stage coalition formation game
2. Stability of coalitions with transfers and commitments
3. Empirical data for simulation analysis

Chapter 4. Results and Discussion
1. Singleton Coalition and Grand Coalition
2. Stable Coalitions without Commitments
3. Stable Coalitions under Commitments
4. Imperfect Coalitions

Chapter 5. Policy Implications and Directions for Further Research
1. Policy Implications
2. Directions for Further Research

Reference

APPENDIX. Explanation on Empirical Model (STACO)
1. Introduction
2. Emissions and Concentration
3. Global Damage Cost Function
4. Global and Regional Benefit Functions
5. Derivation of Abatement Cost Functions

Summary in Korean