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The European Union’s Guidelines for Battery use, Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) and Waste Electrical and Electronic Equivalent (WEEE)
  • Date2017-07-03 00:00
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The European Union’s Guidelines for Battery use, Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) and Waste Electrical and Electronic Equivalent (WEEE)

 

Various countries in the European Union have different ways of using battery. The European Union seeks to ensure cost effective implementation of the directives like Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive. Similarly, the European Recycling Platform is the first WEEE compliance scheme authorized to operate in 15 countries under the European Union.

 

A widely used environmental policy, applicable to many product categories, the Organisation of Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) has defined Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) as “an environmental policy approach in which a producer’s responsibility for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life cycle” (OECD, 2006). In practice, EPR implies that producers take over the responsibility for collecting or taking back used goods and for sorting and treating for their eventual recycling. Such a responsibility may be merely financial or organisational as well. The policy first appeared in the early 1980s in a few European Member States, especially for packaging waste, and since then it has continuously spread around the EU (and abroad).

By definition, the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) concept was first defined by Thomas Lindhqvist in 1990. EPR, as a principle of product policy, was introduced in legislative acts in the early 1990s to address the life-cycle issues of products, using a target-oriented approach, instead of traditional command-and-control type regulation (European Union, 2016: 1).

The EPR policy is thus characterised by the provision of incentives to producers to take into account environmental considerations when designing their products. As the OECD puts it, “while other policy instruments tend to target a single point in the chain, EPR seeks to integrate signals related to the environmental characteristics of products and production processes throughout the product chain” (Ibid).

Rationale behind EPR implementation in the EU

Compared to the traditional solid waste management approach, EPR involves a shift in responsibility (administratively, financially and/or physically) from governments or municipalities (and thus taxpayers) to the entities that make and market the products that are destined to become waste. To this extent, EPR still constitutes the implementation of the polluter-pays principle (PPP), but induces a change in the definition of the ‘‘polluter’. Whereas in the classical version of the PPP the polluter was the individual directly causing pollution (i.e. the consumer), within the EPR framework the polluter is the economic agent who can play a decisive role in avoiding pollution, e.g. through eco-design efforts.

The economic reasoning behind the EPR concept is to have producers internalize treatment and disposal costs so that they have an incentive to design products that last longer and are more easily treated after use. According to a commissioner report by the EU (2014), in practice, however: the post-consumption cost does not adequately take into account the environmental cost of the waste treatment (recycling is then disadvantaged, which justifies the imposition of imposing recycling targets); costs are passed on to consumers, reducing the incentive for producers to invest in eco-design; producers often exert this responsibility collectively, through Producer Responsibility Organisations (PROs) so that benefits gained from producers who improve their products are distributed to all producers who belong to the same PRO.

Individual producer responsibility, i.e. the take back of used products by a single producer, is rare and limited to instances where one producer sells its products only to a limited number of users. It would be much too complex if all producers of a certain product type set up their own take back systems. As a consequence, collective compliance schemes are much more common than individual schemes. In collective schemes, a specific organisation (PRO) is set up to implement the EPR principle in the name of all the adhering companies. PROs potentially exert three main functions, which can be executed in different ways (EC, 2008):

  • financing the collection and treatment of the targeted solid waste;

  • organising and supervising these activities;

  • managing the corresponding data.

THE EPR in the EU Member States

Through the last 20 years, the EPR concept has been widely implemented in the EU with a great variety of EPR schemes and the creation of PROs.

For the four streams targeted by specific Directives (packaging, batteries, ELVs and WEEE), an EPR scheme has been systematically implemented in all Member States. Additional waste streams for which EPR schemes have been most commonly identified within the European Union are: tires, graphic paper, oils, medical waste and agricultural films.

The European Union’s Guidelines for Battery use, Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) and Waste Electrical and Electronic Equivalent (WEEE) 1

Figure 2 shows an overview of the EPR schemes in the EU for batteries

Source: European Commission, 2016

EPR aims to internalise environmental externalities and should provide an incentive for producers to take into account environmental considerations along the products' life, from the design phase to their end-of-life. As such, EPR is to be considered as a major instrument in support of the implementation of the European Waste Hierarchy which “sets the following priority order when shaping waste policy and managing waste at the operational level: prevention, (preparing for) reuse, recycling, recovery and, as the least preferred option, disposal (which includes landfilling and incineration without energy recovery).” (European Commission, 2016: 1).

The rationale behind EPR was framed along with other key economic instruments.  EPR can encourage a change in behaviour of all actors involved in the product value chain: product-makers, retailers, consumers-citizens, local authorities, public and private waste management operators, recyclers and social economy actors. EPR is also identified as a key instrument in link with resource efficiency and raw materials strategies promoted at the European Union level.

At EU level, three Directives introduce EPR as a policy approach: the ELV Directive 2000/53/EC, the new WEEE Directive 2012/19/EU and the Batteries Directive 2006/66/EC. EPR is also widely used in support of the implementation of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (94/62/EC), although the Directive itself does not impose the principle. In addition, article 8 of the Waste Framework Directive 2008/98 sets some principles regarding the implementation of EPR by the European Member States. (Ibid: 7)

It must however be reminded that, beyond these types of waste, in some countries, Extended Producer Responsibility schemes can cover additional products, notably: used oils, used tyres, graphic paper and textile, as well as many other kind of products such as: medicines, fluorinated refrigerant fluids, agricultural films, mobile homes, furniture, etc.

The European Union’s Guidelines for Battery use, Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) and Waste Electrical and Electronic Equivalent (WEEE) 2

The European Union’s Guidelines for Battery use, Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) and Waste Electrical and Electronic Equivalent (WEEE) 3

Figure 3: EPR collection levels on different materials and among the 28 European countries

Source: European Commission’s Guidelines of EPR Final Report (2014)

Working on the premise of shared responsibilities, the European Union Member states have established that European waste legislation currently gives a global framework for the implementation of EPR in Europe. The Member States and their respective legislation are responsible for the implementation of EPR, including regulating the operational aspects of EPR. The present study shows that EPR policies have been designed and implemented in a very heterogeneous manner across Europe. .

In the last ten years, two main evolutions of EPR have occurred:

  • whereas the initial fees paid by producers represented only a partial contribution to solid waste management costs, the operational costs coverage by producers fees has gradually increased, sometimes reaching 100%;

  • whereas the PROs were initially created as entities whose role was merely to aggregate the producers financial contribution, their role has been drifting towards more operational interventions and a broader scope of action (data management, organising operations, launching bids, communication campaigns, etc.).

Such evolutions have accompanied undeniable improvements in waste recycling and recovery performances in all MS. Nevertheless, large differences in performances do exist between Member States. It is also important to note that considerable differences in terms of organisation of EPR schemes can be observed depending on the waste stream.

Most of the instituted EPR schemes (except the Belgian one) cover exclusively mineral-based lubricant oils (industrial, non-edible). The quantities of non-edible waste oil collected vary significantly: from 2.7 kg/cap./year (Portugal) to 5.6 kg/cap./year (Germany). Regeneration rates range between 69% (Spain) and 91% (Belgium).

In Germany, no fee is required from producers: the scheme is self-financing (revenues cover the costs for collection and treatment). In other countries, the total amount of fees collected in 2011 varies from less than 0.2 EUR/cap. (Belgium) to more than 0.7 EUR/cap. (Italy).

The Belgian scheme seems to be the most cost effective: achieving high regeneration rates with a relatively low fee level. The Italian and Finnish schemes achieve fairly high regeneration rates but are much more expensive for producers. The Portuguese and Spanish schemes are about as expensive as each other and cover a similar volume of waste oils (in tonnes/cap./yr) but the Spanish scheme achieves a lower regeneration rate (69% compared to 82%), as 32% of the industrial oils are incinerated with energy recovery.

Differentiated experiences of countries on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equivalent (WEE)

Further, according to the same EU Report on EPR and WEE (Ibid: 33) The quantities covered by an EPR scheme vary from around 75 kg/cap./yr (France, Belgium) to around 165 kg/cap./yr (Netherlands, UK). Most of the differences come from the different scopes of EPR: in some MS, EPR covers only household packaging waste, whereas in other countries it also covers commercial and industrial packaging.

The recycling rate is lowest in the UK (all packaging, 61%) and highest in Belgium (household packaging, 85%). All the studied schemes achieve the targets set by the corresponding Directive.

Fees paid by producers range from 1.1 EUR/cap. (UK, 2011) to 19.7 EUR/cap./yr (Austria, 2012). This very wide range is notably due to the different levels of cost coverage. In the UK, it is estimated that the fee covers only 10% of the total cost of the system, whereas in most other schemes, 100% of net costs are covered (80 % in France).

According to the European Parliament Guidelines on WPR-WEE Procedure (2011), The WEEE recycling rates across countries are fairly homogeneous. All the studied schemes achieve the targets set by the WEEE Directive. High discrepancies arise with regards to the collected quantities: they range from 2.0 kg/cap./yr (Latvia) to 17.5 kg/cap./year (Sweden). The new collection targets set by the recast Directive represent a challenge for most Member States, including in this relatively well-performing sample.

The collection rate for portable batteries ranges from 36% (France) to 72% (Switzerland). All the EPR schemes studied thus have a higher collection rate for portable batteries than the EU target for 2012 (25%). Quantities collected in 2011 range from 0.2 (Netherlands, Austria) to nearly 0.3 kg/cap/year (Denmark, Switzerland).

Out of the six countries studied, four have a fairly cost-efficient scheme and homogeneous performance for portable batteries.

The positive market value of industrial and automotive batteries ensures very high collection rates. All six Member States declare 100% collection rates. These EPR schemes are financed by revenues from recycled materials, and no financial contribution from producers is needed.

 

References:

 

http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008L0098:EN:NOT)

http://www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/extendedproducerresponsibility.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/waste/eu_guidance/introduction.html

https://www.rco.on.ca/uploads/File/2015_EPR_Forum/RCO-Progressing_EPR_in_Ontario-Hestin_presentation.pdf